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ABSTRACT
Human cerebral organoids (HCOs) areminiature brains cultivated in a dish
using pluripotent human cells that, thanks to advanced technologies, tend to
reproduce the development path of the brain of an embryo in the mother’s
uterus. Recent data from studies carried out in di erent laboratories have
indicated that HCOs show complex electrical activity, are receptive to light
stimuli, and can command a muscle connected to them. The presence
of the main neuronal structures in them suggests that, despite currently
lacking vascularization and sensory exchanges with the outside world, more
developed HCOs could exhibit some rudimentary form of consciousness,
specically aminimal sentiencewith respect to the basic experiences of pain
and pleasure. Faced with this possibility, which for many scientists is still a
long way o , we have begun to reect on how we could empirically inves-
tigate the presence of consciousness. If we were certain or had a reasonable
belief that some types of HCOs are sentient, what kind of entity would we
judge them to be? Would they have specic legal protection? Should they
be attributed to a moral status? This article tries to give an initial answer to
these two questions. On the one side, it seems that no special rights can be
claimed for HCOs other than those relating to human biological material.
On the other side, instead, a sentient HCO could aspire to having its moral
status recognized. If this were the case, the law may have to adapt to this
unprecedented situation.
KEYWORDS: brain activity, consciousness, legal protection, integrated
information theory, moral status, personhood, neuroethics
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WHATAREHUMANCEREBRALORGANOIDS?
Even if researchers had long been trying to move from 2D to 3D cellular cultures, the
term “organoid” was not used in scientic literature until ten years ago1. Aer the rst
cases of partial or almost complete growth of some human organs, in 2013, scientists
achieved the rst three-dimensional culture of an aggregate of human nerve cells
guided by the same biochemical process that leads to the formation of the brain during
gestation2. Over a few years, the cerebral or brain organoids cultivated in di erent
laboratories worldwide have started exhibiting an increasing number of characteristics
typical of the human brain. This has attracted the attention not only of neurosci-
entists and those who could benet from this discovery—specically patients and
companies active in the biomedical sector—but also of neuroethicists3. In this article,
besides the ethical aspects of the research on human cerebral organoids (HCOs), we
want to also consider the legal and juridical aspects that could soon open up in this
regard.
In this section, we wish to provide a suciently detailed scientic description of
what HCOs are. In fact, we believe that any legal and ethical discussion cannot be
conductedwithout solid and specic factual informationon the topic inquestion. In the
case of human cerebral organoids, moreover, this information is even more necessary
because they are the result of new and complex biomedical techniques, and some
uncommon emerging features of laboratory-grown entities are precisely what require
careful legal and ethical scrutiny. Those who are already familiar with organoid biology
and the latest literature are welcome to quickly scroll through this section.
So, what is a brain organoid? “A human cerebral organoid is described as a group
of cells that dynamically self-organize into structures containing di erent cell types
that resemble some aspects of the fetal brain. Human brain organoids can be used to
study early stages of neural development. Neurons in brain organoids can connect and
free will, and law at the intersectionwith cognitive and biomedical sciences. Lavazza is the author or the editor
of eleven books. His most recent volumes are: Contemporary Dualism: A Defense (edited with H. Robinson;
Routledge); Frontiers in Neuroethics (Cambridge Publishing Scholars)
Federico Gustavo Pizzetti is Full Professor of Public Law at the University of Milan (Italy), where he also
teaches Biolaw. He is the deputy director of the Department of International, Legal and Historical-Political
Studies. He has published about 130 papers and 8 books. He is a member of the International Forum of
Teachers inBioethics,medical ethics andmedical law,UNESCOChair inBioethics; theEuropeanAssociation
of Health Law; the Italian Society of Neuroethics and Philosophy of the Neurosciences; and the Italian
Association of Constitutional Lawyers. He is aliated to The Initiative onNeuroscience and the Law Project,
Houston Baylor College ofMedicine. His research is mainly focused on End-of-Life Decision-making and the
Law, Constitutional Law and Neuroscience, and Elder Law.
1 Toshiro Sato, Robert G. Vries, Hugo J. Snippert, Marc van de Wetering, Nick Barker, Daniel E. Stange, Johan
H. van Es, Arie Abo, Pekka Kujala, Peter J. Peters, Hans Clevers, Single Lgr5 Stem Cells Build Crypt–Villus
Structures In Vitro without a Mesenchymal Niche, 459 Nature 262 (2009).
2 Madeline A. Lancaster, Magdalena Renner, Carol-Anne Martin, Daniel Wenzel, Louise S. Bicknell, Matthew
E. Hurles, Tessa Homfray, Josef M. Penninger, Andrew P. Jackson, Juergen A. Knoblich, Cerebral Organoids
Model Human Brain Development and Microcephaly, 501 Nature 373 (2013).
3 Andrea Lavazza, Marcello Massimini, Cerebral Organoids: Ethical Issues and Consciousness Assessment. 44 J.
Med. Ethics 606 (2018); Andrea Lavazza, Marcello Massimini, Cerebral Organoids and Consciousness: How
Far AreWeWilling To Go?, 44 J.Med. Ethics 613 (2018); Nita A. Farahany, Henry T. Greely, StevenHyman,
et al.,The Ethics of Experimenting with Human Brain Tissue, 556Nature, 429 (2018);SorinHostiuc,Mugurel
Constantin Rusu, Ionut¸ Negoi, Paula Perlea, BogdanDorobant¸u, EduardDrimaf,TheMoral Status of Cerebral
Organoids, 10 Regen. Ther. 118 (2019).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jlb/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jlb/lsaa005/5854398 by guest on 22 June 2020
Human cerebral organoids as a new legal and ethical challenge • 3
make simplied, organized networks, eventually leading to the developmental steps
that all human brains take”4. Or, to put it more briey, “human brain organoids are
stem cell-derived 3D tissues that self-assemble into organized structures that resemble
the developing human brain”5.
Research on the so-called organoids involves pluripotent stem cells (embryonic
stem cells and induced pluripotent stem cells) and organ-restricted adult stem cells.
Its goal is to obtain three-dimensional models of tissues and organs both for disease
modeling (thanks to HCOs it was possible to better understand how the congenital
Zika syndrome acts on fetal neurodevelopment, while the rst study by Lancaster was
aimed at understanding microcephaly) and drug testing (it is possible to test both the
toxicity and the e ectiveness of new drugs)6. A future goal is to obtain portions of
brain tissue that can replace (by transplantation) damaged parts of the brain in patients
a ected by trauma, strokes, or neurological diseases.
Organoids are therefore biological entities produced in vitro from stem cells whose
di erentiation can be oriented towards the typical organization (architecture and
physiology) of a human adult organ within a specially prepared environment: usually
Matrigel (a mixture of protein from mouse sarcomas) and an adequate sca olding
(made by 3D support matrices). They are placed in a specic broth and in special
reactors and are “guided” in their cell di erentiation and in their initial development
from totipotent stem cells to nerve cells; their subsequent development is autonomous
at di erent degrees based on specic culture. The term “organoid” comes from their
being miniaturized and simplied versions of an organ, although oen endowed with
many of its structural and functional features.
Indeed, the goal for an organoid in a 3D in vitro culture is to “replicate not only the
complexity of the cell types present in the organ and the processes of self-organization
of the tissue, but also the main organization of the whole organ”7; as for cerebral
organoids, they ought to replicate “the appearance of di erent brain regions”. The key
aspects here are self-assembly anddi erentiation,which are theoutcomeof “instructive
signaling cues given to the cells by the extracellular matrix (ECM), the medium,
and also, once the 3D structure assembles, the cell types present in the organoids
themselves”8.
Today the term “organoid” is used both for “the isolation and propagation of adult
stem cell niches in 3D and for the adoption of 3D culture conditions for the directed
di erentiation of pluripotent stem cell lines towards specic developing tissues”9. The
organoids available today reproduce the retina, intestine, kidney, pancreas, liver, inner
ear, thyroid, and so forth. But when it comes to ethical issues, the most relevant ones
4 Harpreet Setia, Alysson R. Muotri, Brain Organoids as a Model System for Human Neurodevelopment and
Disease, Semin. CellDev. Biol.,Doi: 10.1016/j.semcdb.2019.03.002 (2019).
5 Xuyu Qian, Ha Nam Nguyen, Fadi Jacob, Hongjun Song, Guo-li Ming, Using Brain Organoids to Understand
Zika Virus-Induced Microcephaly, 144 Development 952 (2017).
6 Elizabeth Di Lullo, Arnold R. Kriegstein, The Use of Brain Organoids to Investigate Neural Development and
Disease, 18 Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 573 (2017).
7 Ida Kelava, Madeline A. Lancaster, Stem Cell Models of Human Brain Development, 18 Cell Stem Cell 736
(2016).
8 Meritxell Huch, Juergen A. Knoblich, Matthias P. Lutolf, Alfonso Martinez-Arias, The Hope and the Hype of
Organoid Research, 144 Development 938 (2017).
9 Melissa H. Little,Organoids: A Special Issue, 144 Development 935 (2017).
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seem to involve brain organoids, which include cerebral organoids and region-specic
organoids.
The seminal study in this eld was carried out by Lancaster and colleagues, who
started with human adult skin cells reprogrammed as induced pluripotent stem cells so
as to create a brain organoid as a model for the study of microcephaly. The cells taken
from a microcephaly patient were used to form cerebral organoids with characteristics
similar to those of the patient’s brain. Then, thanks to the identication of a defective
protein that is supposed to be related to microcephaly, the researchers replaced it by
creating organoids that seemed to be at least partially protected from microcephaly.
The study by Lancaster and colleagues has shown distinct and interdependent brain
regions with interneural connections and a high level of similarity on a cellular level10.
In the research, organoids of about 4 mm replicated in vitro the development in vivo at
least up to the latemid-fetal period (19–24weeks of gestation), with di erences in gene
expression.
Another successful study was conducted by Qian et al., who have obtained neurons
corresponding to all six layers of the cerebral cortex, but without fully developed and
stable synapses or circuitry11. A further issue, in addition to the underdevelopment of
organoids, is the absence of blood vessels. In order to feed internal cells, Lancaster and
colleagues encapsulated each organoid into a matrix of nutrients and immersed it in a
nutrient bath while the organoids were rotated to assimilate as much food as possible.
But, in general, organoids have a nucleus of cells that tend to rot in a short time due
to lack of vascularization. Also, they are devoid of surrounding embryonic tissues, glial
cells,meninges, and immune cells. Finally, organoidmodels are also limited by the great
variability among organoids and by the absence of a predened axis.
Oneway to achieve vascularization of brain organoids has been tested by implanting
human cerebral organoids at an early stage of their development into an adult mouse
brain. In this way, there was a “fusion” between the host tissues and the human brain
organoid, which was able to develop functional neuronal networks and blood vessels
in the gras12.
Despite these diculties, Lancaster and Knoblich have described a protocol for
“generating 3D brain tissue (...) which closely mimics the endogenous developmental
program. This method can easily be implemented in a standard tissue culture room,
and can give rise to developing cerebral cortex, ventral telencephalon, choroid plexus,
10 Cf. Anca M Pas¸ca, Steven A Sloan, Laura E Clarke, Yuan Tian, Christopher D Makinson, Nina Huber, Chul
HoonKim, Jin-Young Park, Nancy AO’Rourke, KhoaDNguyen, Stephen J Smith, JohnRHuguenard, Daniel
HGeschwind, BenABarres, SergiuPPas¸ca,Functional CorticalNeurons andAstrocytes omHumanPluripotent
Stem Cells in 3D Culture. 12 Nat. Methods 671 (2015).
11 Xuyu Qian, Ha Nam Nguyen, Mingxi M. Song, Christopher, Hadiono, Sarah C. Ogden, Christy Hammack,
Bing Yao, Gregory R. Hamersky, Fadi Jacob, Chun Zhong, Ki-jun Yoon, William Jeang, Li Lin, Yujing Li,
Jai Thakor, Daniel A. Berg, Ce Zhang, Eunchai Kang, Michael Chickering, David Nauen, Cheng-Ying Ho,
ZhexingWen, KimberlyM. Christian, Pei-Yong Shi, Brady J.Maher, HaoWu, Peng Jin, Hengli Tang, Hongjun
Song, Guo-li Ming, Brain-Region-Specic Organoids Using Mini-Bioreactors for Modeling Zikv Exposure, 165
Cell 1238 (2016).
12 Abed AlFatah Mansour, J Tiago Gonçalves, Cooper W Bloyd, Hao Li, Sarah Fernandes, Daphne Quang,
Stephen Johnston, Sarah L Parylak, Xin Jin, Fred H Gage, An In Vivo Model of Functional and Vascularized
Human Brain Organoids, 36 Nat. Biotechnol. 432 (2018).
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and retinal identities, among others, within 1-2 months”13. But there are also layers
of cortex, the hippocampus (a crucial area for memory) and the spinal cord. And
organoids, according to the authors, can be maintained for more than a year in long-
termcultures. Along the same lines, Kelava andLancaster claim that humanpluripotent
stem cells can be used to produce “organoids which faithfully recapitulate, on a cell-
biological and gene expression level, the early period of human embryonic and fetal
brain development”14.
In this vein, Birey and colleagues have produced “three-dimensional spheroids
from human pluripotent stem cells that resemble either the dorsal or ventral forebrain
and contain cortical glutamatergic or GABAergic neurons”, thus recapitulating the
saltatory migration of interneurons in the fetal forebrain. They also showed that aer
migration, interneurons functionally integrate with glutamatergic neurons to form a
microphysiological system15. And “spheroids cells were remarkably similar to those
from corresponding regions of the human fetal brain”, with “both excitatory and
inhibitory neuronal activity”16.
Although brain organoids still have strong limitations in terms of reproducing an
in vivo brain in vitro, attempts are being made to solve the so-called plumbing and
sca olding problems, that is, how to bring oxygen and nutrients (so as to keep the cells
alive) and grow organoids beyond the current millimeter scale. However, it is not to be
forgotten that the in vivo organs dynamically develop their nal form through growth,
reorganization, and di erentiation of cellular material, which are genetically regulated
and in turn regulate themselves epigenetically, depending on the biochemical signals
they receive from their surroundings, the activation or deactivation of specic genes.
Thus, the so-calledmini-brains that grow in vitro, isolated from a complete embryo and
without interaction with the environment, may not be able to fully develop as happens
in vivo.
Indeed, since the breakthrough of the rst study by Lancaster and colleagues, there
has been rapid and considerable progress in the attempt to create HCOs capable of
recapitulating the characteristics of thebrain; even if, asmentioned, there are still strong
limitations, including the absence of vascularizationwhichmakes it impossible to nour-
ish the central layers of cerebral organoids17. Nevertheless, some important features of
the nervous system have recently been observed in brain organoids. HCOs manifest
specic and autonomous electrical activity (i.e. communication between neurons) and
13 Madeline A. Lancaster, Jürgen A. Knoblich, Generation of Cerebral Organoids om Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 9 Nat. Protoc. 2329 (2014).
14 Supra note 7.
15 Fikri Birey, Jimena Andersen, Christopher D.Makinson, Saiful Islam,WuWei, NinaHuber, H. Christina Fan,
Kimberly R. CordesMetzler, Georgia Panagiotakos, Nicholas Thom,Nancy A.O’Rourke, LarsM. Steinmetz,
Jonathan A. Bernstein, Joachim Hallmayer, John R. Huguenard, Sergiu P. Pas¸ca, Assembly of Functionally
Integrated Human Forebrain Spheroids, 545 Nature 54 (2017).
16 J. Gray Camp, Barbara Treutlein, Human Development: Advances in Mini-Brain Technology, 545 Nature 39
(2017).
17 Cf. Missy T. Pham, Kari M. Pollock, Melanie D. Rose, Whitney A. Cary, Heather R. Stewart, Ping Zhou, Jan
A. Nolta, Ben Waldau, Generation of Human Vascularized Brain Organoids, 29 NeuroReport 588 (2018).
Recent studies have shown that this limit could be exceeded.
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are sensitive to light stimulation18 and capable to connect to a spinal cord by sending
nerve impulses that make a muscle contract19.
A recent study demonstrates for the rst time that cortical organoids generated
from induced pluripotent stem cells can spontaneously develop periodic and regular
oscillatory network electrical activity, which resembles the EEG patterns of preterm
babies. This means that, even in the absence of external or subcortical inputs, ten-
month-old HCOs can develop according to a specic genetic program, like all human
beings, and manifest a complex brain activity. “The spontaneous network formation
displayed periodic and regular oscillatory events that were dependent on glutamatergic
andGABAergic signaling”20. Thering rate, up to twoor threeper second, and the kind
of waves—gamma, alpha, and delta waves—are all a hallmark of a vital human brain.
Indeed, amachine-learnedmodel based on a preterm newborn’s EEG features was able
to predict the organoid culture’s age based on the electrical activity of the organoid
itself.
These are extremely signicant steps forward as regards the functionality exhibited
by cerebral organoids. It could therefore be deduced that HCOs have the minimum
organic capacities to use receptors and e ectors and to process the received stimuli and
the feedback of the impulses sent, even if this does not mean that this basic processing
might take the formof a rudimentary consciousness. Indeed, the judgment of neurosci-
entists working with cerebral organoids seems to be skeptic about the possibility that
current (and future) HCOs are capable to develop a minimal mental life21. However,
we still know too little about the mechanisms that trigger human consciousness and
about the sentience of many nonhuman species to be able to make univocal scientic
statements in one direction or another.
On the one hand, for now, HCOs do not grow beyond a very small size compared
to an adult human brain; unlike the latter, they lack spatial organization, di er in the
number, complexity, andmaturity of neurons, do not have the organic feedback typical
of an entire organism and do not have any input and output exchange with an external
environment. On the other hand, as said, HCOs possess the ability to react to sensory
inputs. Also, whole-brain organoids (the only ones dealt with here, as opposed to
brain organoids that aim to reconstruct only specic portions of the brain, such as
the forebrain or cerebellum) show an electrical activity that is very similar to that of
a preterm infant’s brain.
18 Giorgia Quadrato, Tuan Nguyen, Evan Z. Macosko, John L. Sherwood, Sung Min Yang, Daniel Berger,
Natalie Maria, Jorg Scholvin, Melissa Goldman, Justin Kinney, Edward S. Boyden, Je  Lichtman, Ziv M.
Williams, Steven A. McCarroll, Paola Arlotta, Cell Diversity and Network Dynamics in Photosensitive Human
Brain Organoids, 545 Nature 48 (2017).
19 Stefano L. Giandomenico, Susanna B. Mierau, George M. Gibbons, Lea M. D. Wenger, Laura Masullo, Tim-
othy Sit, Magdalena Sutcli e, Jerome Boulanger, Marco Tripodi, Emmanuel Derivery, Ole Paulsen, András
Lakatos, Madeline A. Lancaster, Cerebral Organoids at the Air-Liquid Interface Generate Diverse Nerve Tracts
with Functional Output, 22 Nat. Neurosci. 669 (2019).
20 Cleber A. Trujillo, RichardGao, Priscilla D. Negraes, JingGu, Justin Buchanan, Sebastian Preissl, AllenWang,
Wei Wu, Gabriel G. Haddad, Isaac A. Chaim, Alain Domissy, Matthieu Vandenberghe, Anna Devor, Gene
W. Yeo, Bradley Voytek, Alysson R. Muotri, Oscillatory Waves Emerging om Cortical Organoids Model Early
Human Brain Network Development. Cell Stem Cell. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.stem.2019.08.002 (2019).
21 Ian Stevens, Human Brain Organoids: the Science, the Ethics, https://www.neuroethicssociety.org/oxford-
meeting-2018 (2018).
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Recently, laboratory-cultivated models of the cerebral cortex have exhibited a syn-
chronized neural activity, which is a hallmark of the main brain functions, including
memory22. Also, the HCOs’ neurons re spontaneously, indicating that even this type
of nerve cells grown in vitro show the typical activity of human neurons, allowing for
the development and creation of new connections.
All this can raise ethical issues that prima facie deal with the possibility of creating
sentient entities of human origin that could have a moral status. But before addressing
this issue, which has already been the subject of some reections23, wewant to consider
some legal aspects that may instead be completely unprecedented.
FROMTHE LABTOTHECOURT: AHYPOTHETICAL LEGAL SCENARIO
As we have seen, ethical issues concerning HCOs are already on the agenda. The
rapid progress of the research could lead, in a relatively short time, to the creation of
human cerebral organoids that have a larger size than the current ones, are connected
both to sensory receptors and to organic (muscle) or articial e ectors, and manifest
a coordinated electrical activity quite similar to that of a newborn’s brain, despite the
morphological and functional di erences mentioned. This being the case, one can
hypothesize a scenario that, as we shall see shortly, is certainly imaginative but can be
used to introduce very relevant legal issues.
We are aware that discussing the following scenario paradoxically brings us closer
to its realization, both because it constitutes a possible suggestion for those who wish
to implement it, and because the argument we develop gives plausibility to the issues
raised. However, we believe that it is the task of biomedical ethics—and specically
neuroethics in the case in question—to address potential ethical concerns even before
the researchmakes themurgent, if the expected ndings are relevant both in themselves
and in terms of their impact on society24. Yet, discussing potential risks or suggesting
caution in conduct does not mean damaging the research or hindering its benets. In
fact, if there are no particularly strong concerns or objections and if the research is
carried out according to shared ethical rules of nonmalecence, benecence, justice,
and autonomy of the subjects involved, one should not introduce obstacles related to
prejudice or to preference for the status quo. But this does not exclude that research
on HCOs may have potential consequences that have not been suciently considered
or completely overlooked and that deserve further in-depth evaluation, as we’ll explain
below.
So, let’s come to the hypothetical scenario. Consider a neurobiology laboratory
where brain organoids are grown with all the characteristics listed above: as said,
the goal of the research is to make them more and more similar to a typical human
brain. Indeed, onemay well think that a human cerebral organoid shares some relevant
22 Hideya Sakaguchi, Yuki Ozaki, Tomoka Ashida, Takayoshi Matsubara, Naotaka Oishi, Shunsuke Kihara, Jun
Takahashi, Self-Organized Synchronous Calcium Transients in a Cultured Human Neural Network Derived om
Cerebral Organoids, 13 StemCell Rep. 1 (2019).
23 MeganMunsie, InsooHyun, Jeremy Sugarman, Ethical Issues in HumanOrganoid andGastruloid Research, 144
Development 942 (2017).
24 Adina Roskies, Neuroethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/neuroethics/ (2016); Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics: A New
Framework—From Bioethics to Anthropology. In: Id. (ed.), Frontiers inNeuroethics (2016).
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featureswith ahumanbeing andcannotbe treated as simple lumpofbiologicalmaterial.
Now, imagine that a researcher questioned the ethical correctness of such practices, on
grounds that the brains thus created might have a glimpse of sentience (understood as
the minimal degree of consciousness, i.e. the ability to experience basic phenomenal
states such as pain and other sensations related to physical homeostasis, such as lack of
vital resources)25. This researcher, unable to raise the case inside the laboratory, could
go to the local police department or directly to the relevant judicial authority and report
the fact that destructive experiments are being carried out on quasi-brains grown in a
dish from human tissues.
Such a situation should be considered as totally new and unprecedented. Therefore,
it is dicult to foresee the legal framework in which it would be dealt with. Probably
in every country, there would be a somehow di erent procedure for ling such a
complaint. In fact, one should wonder in what legislative framework this “complaint”
should be placed. Would there be the conditions for some judicial intervention? The
fact that brain death has become the criterion to establish a person’s death seems
to entail that the brain is the central and (perhaps) identifying organic element of
the person also in a legal sense. So, does the existence of human cerebral organoids
have any implications about the legal denitions of the beginning and end of life?
And if it were established that organoids do have a minimum level of sentience,
or that they can experience pain as some animals do, would this have some legal
signicance?
Potential answers to such highly problematic and sophisticated questions need to
consider the current legal framework. In this sense, to answer the question whether
there should be some special protection for human brain organoids, broadly under-
stood as vital biological structures of human origin cultivated in vitro, we believe
that it is useful to discuss how the Italian system (and also the European system, as
a superordinate) might address the legal status of human cerebral organoids (albeit
with the specicity of each individual legal system). So, on the basis of our specic
knowledge of the Italian legal system, which is traditionally very “protective” of human
life and is considered rather conservative in terms of bioethics, we will now carry
out an analysis of how the Italian law could address the scenario hypothesized above.
We will do so in the belief that, despite some secondary di erences, the Italian and
European legislations and the related jurisprudence can be seen as illustrative of most
legal systems of theWesternworld and also of several countries of other legal traditions.
25 It is sometimes argued that since there are no pain receptors in the brain itself, an HCO is probably not
vulnerable to pain. Thatmay be true but consider the phenomenon of phantom limbs: individuals sometimes
report feeling pain in a limb that has been amputated, and that pain is “experienced” in the brain in the
absence of any actual peripheral stimulation. Now, it cannot be excluded that the phantom limb phenomenon
is possible precisely because there previously was peripheral stimulation, something that is impossible in the
case ofHCOs.Nevertheless, it canbehypothesized that a conscious entitywithout connections to the external
environment may su er from this “unnatural” condition compared to the normal development of a human
brain, even if an HCO would not be aware of the di erence between its own situation and that of a human
being whose brain is connected to the body. There is a wide debate about the quality of life of people su ering
from locked-in syndrome or believed to be in a persistent but actually conscious vegetative state. What we
observe in nature is that all living beings tend to avoid environments or situations that are supposed to be
distressing for them, so it would be strange if HCOs were the only conscious entities without the ability to
experience su ering in a broad sense.
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In Italy, as in the rest of Europe (as well as in the U.S.26, with the exemption of
New Jersey27), legal death coincides with the irreversible termination of all the activities
of the brain (Article 1 of the L. n. 578/1993 (It.))28. As the Italian Constitutional
Court stated, that criterion should be respectful of both the popular sentiment and the
scientic framework, in compliance with the constitutional principles29. Now, to be
coherent with the fundamental constitutional principles, the legal death criterion cho-
sen by the lawmust be (in general) respectful of life, unique, robust in its irreversibility,
and referred to the extinction of the person as a whole30.
In fact, it would go against the essential content of human dignity to have a legal
discipline that reduces the human being to one of its constituent parts instead of the
whole that ontologically characterizes it, if that part does not perform any essential and
irreplaceable functionof integrationof thedi erent organs and tissues in a “coordinated
whole”. On the other hand, however, it cannot be permitted to keep a body in an
intensive care unit if this body is only a set of isolated anatomical parts, kept in operation
by machines, without any possibility of restoring the systemic unity that creates the
person. Such “ad innitum” deferment of the funeral, in fact, would trample the dignity
of the deceased, preventing the body to reach the peace of the cemetery at the end of
life. Moreover, waiting too long will hinder the possibility of transplanting the organs
and tissue “ex mortuo”, before necrosis, thus a ecting the principle of social solidarity,
which underlies the promotion and development of transplantation medicine.
In the light of what is assured by current scientic medical acquisitions, the irre-
versible loss of brain function—as the Italian Constitutional Court arms—guarantees
that the organic unity of the body as an integrated system of anatomic parts is lost
forever31. Of course, the disappearance of legal personhood aer brain death does not
mean that the corpse should be considered a simple “object,” deprived of dignity
and legal protection. In fact, the corpse and its parts cannot be traded or disposed
of as waste and shall be preserved carefully in cemeteries by inhumation, which is
specically regulated by mortuary rules (D.P.R. n. 285/1990 (It.))32. Moreover, the
26 Thaddeus M. Pope, Brain Death and the Law: Hard Cases and Legal Challenges, 48 Hastings Ctr. Rep. S46
(2019); Winston Chiong, Brain Death without Denitions, 35 Hastings Ctr. Rep., 20 (2005); Robert D.
Truog, Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?, 27 Hastings Ctr. Rep., 29 (1997); Thomas Brante, Margareta
Hallberg, Brain or Heart? The Controversy over the Concept of Death, 21 Soc. Stud. Sci. 389 (1991); Andra
le Roux-Kemp, The Moment of Death: Law, Society and Science, 29 Obiter 260 (2008); D. Alan Shewmon
D.A., Brain Death: Can It Be Resuscitated? 39 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 18 (2002); James L. Bernat, Charles M.
Culver, Bernard Gert, On the Denition and Criterion of Death, 94 Ann. Intern. Med. 389 (1981); Michael
Near Collins, Death, Brain Death, and the Limits of Science: Why the Whole-Brain Concept of Death is a Flawed
Public Policy, 38 J.L.Med. & Ethics 667 (2010); Paul S. Rothstein, Piercing the Veil: The Limits of Brain Death
as a Legal Fiction 32 U. Fla. L. Rev. 275 (1979–1980).
27 Michael A. Grodin, Religious Exemptions: Brain Death and Jewish Law, 36 J. Church& St., 357 (1994).
28 For a further analysis of the evolution of Italian legal framework about the denition of death and the related
references, see (in Italian) Federico G. Pizzetti, La morte e la legge. La disciplina sulla denizione di morte e
l’accertamento dellamorte legale dall’Unità d’Italia a oggi (e a domani), in Storiadelladefinizionedimorte
391 (F.P. de Ceglia ed., 2014). It should be pointed out here that the (few) references to works in Italian
are included for scientic completeness and precision, but they are not decisive for the understanding of the
subject we are discussing here.
29 Corte cost., 27 luglio 1995, n. 414, Giur. It. 1996, I, 26 (It.).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Cass., 17 maggio 1971, Riv. pen. 1972, 888 (It.); Cass., 2 febbraio 1960, Giust. pen. 1960, II, 354 (It.).
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abuse of a corpse (even in cases of stillbirth, if the fetus has a “human gure”33), or
the destruction, suppression or hiding of a dead body34, or else the use of a cadaver for
scientic experiments or teaching without the regular permission are crimes punished
by the law (articles 410-413 C.p. (It.)). Now, given that the brain and its complete and
irreversible switch-o  play a paramount role in ascertaining legal death—that is the
extinction of a human legal person, the holder of dignity, rights, and duties—one may
be tempted to use the same criterion with human cerebral organoids.
From this point of view, given that there is no specic law that regulates organoids,
one may argue as follows. Since the human cerebral organoid presents some neuronal
activity, and therefore is not dead according to the brain death criterion used for legal
subjects, destroying that organoid would imply to breach the dignity and the rights—
rst and foremost the right to life—of a legal entity. This argument, however, does
not seem robust enough from a legal perspective. In fact, as mentioned, the Italian
Constitutional Court plainly arms that the end point of a “legal person” is only
reached with the irreversible loss of an organ which is able “per se” to “coordinate” and
“integrate” in an organic “unity” all the several and di erent parts of the “entire human
organism”35 .
Human cerebral organoids do not seem to perform any activity of “coordination”
and “integration” of an entire human person. As said before, in fact, those organoids
are the result of reengineered adult stem cells and are genetically reprogrammed
to “recreate” only pieces of neuronal tissues in a Petri dish—not an entire human
being. Moreover, the organoids are by no means “embodied parts” of a complete
human body, nor do they function as factors useful for maintaining the “systemic
unity” of the several physical apparatuses of a real human being. Now, one may argue
that, in a (remote?) future, cerebral organoids may develop enough as to generate
patterns of sophisticated “mental” activity, and might also be connected to some
other human bodily components (similar to the embodied human brain)36 . But,
even in this futuristic hypothesis, it remains highly questionable and rebuttable if
those organoids will be legally equivalent to the human brain in the light of the
current (Italian) normative provisions about human legal subjectivity and human legal
personhood.
In fact, from a legal point of view, the application of the brain criterion to identify
human death presupposes—of course—the legal existence of a human being (body
and mind), who was once alive. According to article 1 of the Italian Civil Code, legal
personhood starts with birth, i.e. with the complete detachment of the newborn from
the mother’s womb (if the baby shows at least one vital sign). Moreover, according to
33 Cass., sez. I, 15 giugno 1959, Giust. Pen., 1960, II, 246 (It.) and Cass., sez. II, 2 December 1942, Giust. Pen.,
1943, II, 306 (It.).
34 Stefano Biondi, Property on Bodily Parts, Dignity and Sovereignty: Some Comparative Reections on the English
and Italian Law of Organ Transplantations, 54 Acta Jur. Hng. 90 (2013); in general Imogen Jones, A Grave
O ence: Corpse Desecration and the Criminal Law, 37 Legal Stud. 599 (2017).
35 Supra note 28.
36 Yvonne Cripps, The Global Person: Pig- Human Embryos, Personhood, and Precision Medicine, 25 Ind.
J. Global Legal Stud. 701, 714 (2018), also quoting Paul Knoeper, Human Chimera Research’s
Huge (and Thorny) Potential, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/2016/09/human-chimera-researchs-huge-
thorny-potential/ (Sept. 19, 2016, accessed Aug. 1, 2019).
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L. n. 40/200437, the embryo, despite not being “born” yet, is nevertheless also a “legal
subject” (though not a legal person)38: it is vested with human nature and dignity, and
therefore holds the rights to life, health, and development.
The Italian and European case-law39 specify that an embryo should be considered
a “human subject”, and not merely a “possess”, if (and only if) it contains the “origin
of human life”, which means that it must have the “intrinsic” ability to self-develop
into a human being40. It can be said that a human cerebral organoid is a never-born
entity: an HCO, in fact, was not born from a womb, and is also profoundly di erent
from a human embryo. The cerebral organoid, in fact, is the product of sophisticated
genetic techniques on adult (and not embryonal) stem cells, which does not show
any aptitude to self-develop into a complete human being. As a conclusion, cerebral
organoids cannot be considered, under any legal circumstances, as “subjects” or, a
fortiori, as “persons.”
Therefore, the destruction of cerebral organoids should not be regarded as the
suppression of “someone” (a legal “subject” or a legal “person”: “homo/persona”). Rather,
it shall be legally evaluated as the destruction of “something” (a legal object: “res”)—i.e.
biological material. Incidentally, it may be also noted that a cerebral organoid cannot
be treated as the result of human reproductive cloning. So, manipulating organoids is
not forbidden under article 3, section 2, letter d) EUCFR and under article 1 of the
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings.
HCOs share the same nuclear genetic set as an individual whose cells have been
taken to be reduced at a staminal level. But they are the product of a manipulative
technique, which does not end in the creation of a human being, genetically identical
to the “original” cloned. The result, in fact, is “only” the development of a portion
of (neuronal) tissue (we assume here that the rules governing donation, informed
consent, conservation of biologicalmaterial, and any intellectual property rights, which
are not the focus of our discussion, are respected.)
37 Gianluca Montanari Vergallo, Simona Zaami, Valerio Bruti, Fabrizio Signore, Enrico Marinelli, How the
Legislation on Medically Assisted Procreation Has Evolved in Italy 36 Med. & L. 5 (2017); Andrea Boggio, The
Legalisation of Gamete Donation in Italy, 24 Eur. J. Health L. 85 (2017).
38 Corte cost., 18 February 1975, n. 27, Giur. it. 1975, I, 1416 (It.).
39 E.C.J., 18December 2014 n.C-364/13, International StemCell Corporation, 2014E.C.R. 2451; Eur. Ct.H.R.
28 May 2013, n. 46470/11, Parrillo v. Italy, 249 Eur. Ct. H.R (2015); Corte cost., 13 aprile 2016, n. 84, Foro
It. 2016, 5, I, 1509.
40 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 197 (2001); Ali
Seyhan Ug˘urlu, Bioethics and the Patent Eligibility ofHuman Embryonic Stem Cells-Related
Inventions in Europe 55–71 (2014); Timo Minssen and Ana Nordberg, The Evolution of the CJEU’s
Case Law on Stem Cell Patents: Context, Outcome and Implications of Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell
Corporation, 5 Nordic Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 493 (2015); Alice Yuen-Ting Wong, Aurélie Mahalatchimy,
Human stem cells patents—Emerging issues and challenges in Europe,United States, China, and Japan21 J.World
Intell. Prop. 326 (2018); Daniele D’Alvia and Angelo Vignalisi Ferraro, The (Legal) Qualication of the
Embryo and Its Utilization for Scientic Research Purposes under the European Multilevel Protection System of
Fundamental Rights, 26 Eur. Rev. Private L. 421 (2018); Palmer E. Hurst, Christina A. Hurst, Baby Steps:
The European Court of Human Rights Moves Closer to Protecting the Unborn in Parrillo v. Italy, 2 J. Glob. Just.
& Pub. Pol’y 155 (2015–2016); Robinson Robbie, The Legal Nature of the Embryo: Legal Subject or Legal
Object, 21 Potchefstroom Elec. L.J. 1 (2018); Amy Lai, The Possible Impact of Legal Globalization on the
ECJ Decision on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patients and Its Implications, 50 Int’l Law. 261 (2016–2017).
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All this being said, however, the law should deal with the development of human
cerebral organoids, especially if they are to become, in the future, sophisticated sentient
entities (and evenmore so if they are to acquire some conscious capabilities). As is well
known, in fact, the law (in Italy and elsewhere) currently protects animals—which are
living but not human entities, and which do not have legal personhood41—against torture,
cruelty, severe su ering both in clinical and cosmetic trials (Dir. n. 2010/63/UE),
and in everyday life (articles 544-ter and 727 C.p. (It.)). Further restrictions were
introduced by the legislative decree (n. 26/2014). Such provisions reect people’s
general mercy (public feeling) towards living entities that may su er distress (even
if not consciously). But the same rules also protect the integrity and the well-being
of animals (although animals are not the holders of rights because they do not have
legal subjectivity42). From this point of view, therefore, it does not seem unreasonable
to promulgate new rules for clinical trials to prevent “su ering” in human cerebral
organoids, even if they are neither human legal subjects nor human legal person.
Those limitations should be justied on a double ground.On the one hand, banning
the development and use of highly developed organoids is a way to protect the popular
sentiment ofmercy. Indeed, the public is likely to feelmercy (and tobe scared) for those
“quasi-brains” (developed cerebral organoids), so close to our brains as to have “human-
like” feelings and emotions (and probably some form of blurred memories), living
in laboratories and undergoing several experiments. That mercy, worthy of juridical
appreciation, should prevent the realization of highly developed cerebral organoids,
understood as entities able to generate “human-like” patterns and therefore to feel
feelings in the above-mentioned conditions.
On the other hand, banning the development of highly sophisticated cerebral
organoids will prevent those entities from severe su ering. Because the scientic
and technological research for the promotion and safeguard of human health is a
constitutional and European value (articles 9, 32 and 33Cost. (It.); article 13 EUCFR;
article 3 TUE; article 1 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine), the
limitation should be reasonable and proportional. This means that the research on
organoids and the development of cerebral organoids for health purposes (diagnosis,
treatments) should not be impeded. The limitations should only apply to experiments
aimed at “producing” highly developed and sophisticated brain organoids capable of
mimicking human superior cognitive functions and human emotional feelings of pain
and distress43.
41 SeeAniB. Satz,Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-Convergence,Hierarchy, andProperty, 16Animal
Law 1 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer, 30 U. Chicago Law School
PublicLaw&LegalTheoryWorkingPapers (2002);RichardA. Epstein,Animals asObjects, or Subjects,
of Rights, 171 U. Chicago Law & Economics, OlinWorking Paper (2002); Wendy A. Adams,Human
Subjects and Animal Objects: Animals as ‘Other’ in Law, 3 J. Animal L. & Ethics 29 (2009); Richard L. Cupp,
Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 465 (2017); Reed
Elizabeth Loder,Animal Dignity, 23 AnimalL. 1 (2016); Francis X. Shen, Law andNeuroscience 2.0, 48 Ariz.
St. L. J. 1043, 1074–1075 (2017).
42 Cass., sez. III, 28 February 2019, n. 16039, Dir. & Giust. 2019.
43 It might be argued that the law (in Italy or elsewhere) has the power to extend the legal personhood—and
therefore all the set of rights related to the legal personhood—toHCOs, even if HCOs cannot be considered
as a “human person”. This scenario has some analogies with the ongoing debate about the recognition of a
specic legal personhood to IA. For, likeHCOs a instantation of IA cannot be considered as a “humanperson”.
For example, it has been reported that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has given “Saudi’s citizenship”—and,
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WHATMIGHTBETHEMORAL STATUSOFHUMANCEREBRAL
ORGANOIDS?
The legal system does not seem to give special consideration or protection to human
cerebral organoids as such. However, it can be assessed whether HCOs may acquire a
moral status at a certain stage of their development andwhat kind of rightsmight result
from this. It can be said that moral status is the condition by which a certain entity
is considered morally as such and not in dependence on other entities44. Status is the
condition of a certain entity within a system of evaluations, while the adjective moral
species the typeof relevant evaluations.This is not the same as saying thatmoral status
is the moral value of a certain entity, since entities with the same moral status can have
a di erent moral value.
Moral status is attributed to an entity on thebasis of properties and relationships that
the entity itself has or manifests, but which do not necessarily depend on the intention
or will of the entity and which, on the contrary, may be independent of the entity’s
ability to have volitions, that is, be attributes related to its constitution as such. In this
sense, the fundamental moral status denes the type of rights to which an entity is
entitled and theweight of its interests, i.e. the set of appropriate practical and evaluative
attitudes that other moral agents must have towards it.
There is a general consensus that only entities that have subjective interests can have
a moral status, i.e. entities that can have some kind of subjective experience and can be
therefore, it has also recognized the legal capacity insofar as the citizenship implies the legal personhood—to
an android named “Sophia” (see for an analysis of the case: Federico G. Pizzetti, The Robot Sophia as a “New
Citizen” of Saudi Arabia: What About Granting Legal Personhood, “Citizenship” and Eventually Dignity to Non-
Human Entities with Articial Intelligence?, 133 Notizie di Politeia 63 (2019)). The European Parliament
resolution of February 16, 2017, with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics
(2015/2103(INL)), urged the Commission to explore the implications of “creating a specic legal status
for robots” and of “applying electronic personality to cases where robots make smart autonomous decisions
or otherwise interact with third parties independently”. However, there is a relevant di erence between the
possible recognition of legal personhood to an android and to HCOs. While a robot is made of inorganic
material, HCOs are made of human cells. If HCOs were vested of legal personhood, that insulated part of
human tissue, which will never become a human body, would be considered substantively as “equivalent” to
a human entity, at least under the point of view of the legal framework. That sort of “equivalence” might raise
serious questions; e.g. granting legal personhood to HCOs is, or not, fully consistent with the respect of the
fundamental right of human dignity (article 1 of the EUCFR; article 1 of the Convention on Human Right
and Biomedicine; article 1 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights; article 2 and 3 Cost. (It.))?.
Under a specic viewpoint, equating the spare parts of human body to whole human body might represent
a “reduction” or a “degradation” of human dignity, as a right is vested uniquely in the human entity “as a
whole” (even if that human entity has not yet reached the stage of a human body like the embryos or the
fetuses during the pregnancy). As to the possible transformation of the legal concept of personhood based
on the evolution of biosciences and informatics, see Visa A.J. Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (eds), Legal
Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (2017); Tomasz Pietrzykowski,
Personhood Beyond Humanism Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous Agents and the Law (2018);
Amedeo Santosuosso, If the agent is not necessarily a human being. Some legal thoughts, inGenetics, Robotics,
Law, Punishment 545–561 (D. Provolo, S. Riondato, F. Yenisey eds., 2014); Woodrow Bareld and Ugo
Pagallo, Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence (2018); Gunther Teubner,
Digital Personhood? The Status of Autonomous Software Agents in Private Law, Ancilla Iuris 107–149 (2018).
44 Agnieszka Jaworska, Julie Tannenbaum, The Grounds of Moral Status, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2018/entries/grounds-moral-status/; Federico Zuolo, Il problema dello status morale, 13 APhEx, http://
www.aphex.it/index.php?Temi=557D03012202740321040705777327.
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“wronged”45, where being wronged is to be understood in the broadest sense. And the
attribution of a certain moral status generally depends on the possession of a certain
morally relevant characteristic. If, therefore, we believe that an HCO that proves to
have even just the slightest sentience should be a candidate for the recognition of some
protection or moral status, we would probably have to follow this formal scheme to
reach a solid, though probably not unanimous, conclusion:
A. To obtain amoral status, it is generally necessary to have some kind of subjec-
tive interest, and that is typically to have some kind of subjective experience.
B. In addition, to obtain a moral status, it is necessary (B1) to possess a certain
morally relevant characteristic; or (B2) tobepart of a relationshipof similarity
or biological belonging; or (B3) to be inserted in a network of signicant and
appropriate relationships (such as recognition, care and respect)—these are
the main theories of justication of the attribution of the moral status to an
entity.
C. Aer having attributed a moral status to an entity not hitherto considered
from this point of view, it is necessary to clarify the moral hierarchy in which
this entity is placed, what kind of rights it acquires, and what obligations
other moral agents have towards it. This must be done, however, bearing in
mind that (C1) obtaining a moral status does not in itself imply ownership
of specic rights and does not impose specic obligations on other moral
agents; and (C2) a moral status can be analytically broken down into (i) a
purely evaluative function, which attributes an intrinsic value to the entity in
question, and (ii) into a prescriptive function, for which this intrinsic value
requires a certain treatment on part of moral agents.
The starting point (A) is therefore sentience: the minimal ability to experience
sensations, which can be considered a minimal or basic degree of consciousness, if one
believes that consciousness is a property that comes in degrees. For a human cerebral
organoid to be attributed a moral status, it should therefore exhibit a minimal or basic
formof consciousness.We are developing amoral argument here, butwe cannot ignore
the epistemological and empirical aspects of ascertaining the possible sentience of an
HCO. In this sense, di erent criteria can be used, always keeping inmind that a human
cerebral organoid cannot communicate or give external signals of its condition.
The rst criterion that has been proposed concerns a specic theory of conscious-
ness, which is one of the most inuential theories in today’s debate. The Integrated
Information Theory (IIT) posits two phenomenic axioms that give rise to postulates
on the properties of brain mechanisms that support consciousness46. The axioms are
(i) conscious experience is informative (each conscious experience di ers in its specic
45 Jaworska, Tannenbaum, supra note 43.
46 Christof Koch,MarcelloMassimini,Melanie Boly,GiulioTononi,Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and
problems, 17 Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 307 (2016); Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Christof
Koch, Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical Substrate, 17 Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
450 (2016); Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, The Neural Correlates of Consciousness An Update, 1124 Ann.
Ny. Acad. Sci. 239 (2008); Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?, 370
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ways fromcountless otherpossible experiences); (ii) conscious experience is integrated
(every conscious experience cannot be divided into parts). It follows that a system has
a subjective experience to the extent that it is capable of integrating information.
This capacity depends on an optimal balance between di erentiation (information)
and unity (integration), a nontrivial condition for a physical system. On the contrary,
at the rst sight, it would seem like these two properties are extremely dicult to
reconcile. The IIT proposes a theoretical measure (PHI) and empirical metrics to
quantify the ability of a system to integrate information.
Based on these aspects of consciousness, an objective measure has been proposed
that is a proxy for the presence of consciousness in a living being. The perturbational
complexity index (PCI) is a parameter inspired by the main postulate of IIT, namely
that consciousness is based on the joint presence of integration and di erentiation in
the brain. The calculation of the PCI locally involves perturbing the cerebral cortex
by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and measuring the complexity of the
electrical response in the rest of the brain by EEG.
The basic idea is that the PCI is low if the interactions between neuronal elements
are reduced (loss of integration), because the response induced by TMS is limited in
space. The PCI is low even if many connected areas react to the perturbation, but
they do so in a stereotyped way (with a loss of di erentiation), because in this case
the response is wide but not complex. The PCI should only reach high values if the
initial disturbance is transmitted to a large network of neuronal elements that react in
a di erentiated way. As such, the PCI is independent of sensory processing, executive
function or motor behavior. For this reason, with specic technologies, it could also be
applied to human cerebral organoids47.
Another criterion concerns the cerebral correlates of phenomenal experience.There
are currently some hypotheses about what areas of the brain are necessary for the
Philos. T. Roy. Soc. B., 20140167 (2015). Giulio Tononi, Olaf Sporns,Measuring Information Integration, 4
BMCNeurosci. 31 (2003).
47 A reviewer suggested a parallelism between cerebral organoids and articial intelligence. The suggestion is
interesting and in fact IIT allows one to establish a substantial di erence between a human brain, capable
of giving life to conscious experience, and a computer (see also note 43). As explained by Christoph Koch
(The Feeling of Life Itself:WhyConsciousness isWidespread butCan’t beComputed [2019]),
“intelligence is about doing while experience is about being” (p. 141). Specically, “the larger the computer,
the more obvious its lack of integration owing to its sparse connectivity compared to brains, the lack of
internal fan-in and fan-out, its modularity and its serial design” (p. 148). The point is that “two systems can
be functionally equivalent, they can compute the same input-output function, but they don’t share the same
intrinsic cause-e ect form” (Ib.). In this sense, a nonsentient machine seems NOT to have a moral status
comparable to that of an entity capable of experience.This does not preclude treatingnonsentient entitieswith
respect or attributing value to them, whether contingent or absolute, instrumental or intrinsic. For example,
an extraordinarily powerful computer capable of implementing an evolved form of articial intelligence could
be the only way to nd a vaccine for an unknown and aggressive virus, or it could produce performances
capable of arousing emotions just like the unrepeatable masterpieces of art (think of Leonardo’sMona Lisa).
There would probably be moral disagreement about the priority to be given to the protection of such a
machine over sentient entities such as an HCO in an advanced stage of development or a fetus, but also an
adult human being. A consequentialist ethical perspective would assess the likely e ects of any choice in this
respect,while aKantiandeontological approach suchas that set out in this paperwouldgivepriority to sentient
entities capable of experience (andmoral autonomy), considered valuable in themselves and not subordinate
to others.
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appearance of consciousness48. In our case, applying an inductive criterion, the pres-
ence of these areas in a developed and active form could be considered a proxy for
the onset of consciousness in HCOs, despite their lack of a direct exchange with
the external environment. Indicators and criteria concerning functional aspects have
recently been listed to discern the presence of consciousness in animals and intelligent
machines49, but they are dicult to test in cerebral organoids50.
It is also necessary tomake a further specication so that the consolidated analytical-
conceptual and empirical process of attributing moral status to a living being can be
made suitable for the case of human brain organoids. In general, for most of the cases
dealt with in the moral eld, it is not in dispute whether the living being in question is
sentient. In these cases, it makes sense that the characteristic (B1) by which the being
can be granted a moral status is phenomenal consciousness, that is, the unique and
specic ability of every individual to have conscious experiences, such that no one else
can have those same experiences. From this condition, one can deduce the inviolable
dignity of that living being (see below).
For human cerebral organoids, however, the minimal ability to experience sensa-
tions (A) cannot be taken for granted: on the contrary, the initial presumption is the
exact opposite, since HCOs are one-h of an inch across, have some millions of
neurons instead of billions, and only few cell types out of 100,000. Therefore, rstly
it must be shown that HCOs are potential candidates for a moral status and, once
this condition (A) has been ascertained, it is then possible to proceed to identify
possible criteria that make them eligible for a moral status. In the case of organoids,
one of the criteria—(B1)—may be the presence of a certain degree of consciousness,
probably higher—although tobequantied,with all the diculties involved—than the
minimum degree that is the precondition (A) for obtaining a moral status.
According to (B), to obtain a moral status, it is necessary (B1) to possess a certain
morally relevant characteristic or (B2) to be part of a relationship of similarity or
biological belonging. According to (B1), it is plausible to think that if a human cerebral
organoid developed at least some form of consciousness (sentience), it would have
a dignity that we do not acknowledge in inanimate objects. Here we are following
Kriegel’s argument51. Dignity can be considered not to be a primary and essential
attribute, in the sense that there is no explanation why it is attached to some entities
but not others. In fact, it seems legitimate to believe that things have specic empirical
properties underlying their dignity,whichmaybenonevaluative genetic, psychological,
or other empirical properties. In general, we believe that we have obligations towards
people and not towards rocks, and this must have to do with the factual di erences
between people and rocks.
48 Todd E. Feinberg, Jon Mallatt. The Nature of Primary Consciousness. A New Synthesis, 43 Conscious. Cogn.
113 (2016).
49 Cyriel Pennartz, Michele Farisco, Kathinka Evers, Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and
Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach, 13 Front. Syst. Neurosci. (2019).
50 Cf.MatthewOwen,Mihretu P.Guta,Physically SucientNeuralMechanisms of Consciousness, 13 Front. Syst.
Neurosci. (2019).
51 UriahKriegel,Dignity and thePhenomenology ofRecognition-Respect, in John J.DrummondandSoniaRinofner-
Kreidl (eds.), Emotional Experience: Ethical and Social Significance (2017); Uriah Kriegel, The
Value of Consciousness, 79 Analysis 503 (2019).
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Kriegel argues that the basis of dignity is exactly phenomenal consciousness. In his
words, “to describe someone as having dignity is to ascribe to her a certain inviolability;
and such inviolability attaches to conscious creatures precisely in virtue of the fact that
the conscious experiences of each conscious creature can only be experienced by them.
I can know about your sadness, and through empathy I may even experience a token
sadness type-identical to your token sadness; but I cannot feel your token sadness. On
the emerging view, an entity exacts respect and merits treatment as an end just if it is a
phenomenally conscious creature”52.
One could argue that HCOs do not and will not have the phenomenal complexity
that comeswith sadness. ButKriegel himself species that the ‘phenomenally grounded
dignity’ approach “entails that we have duties towards not only human beings but all
conscious beings, including nonhuman conscious animals: these animals ought to be
treated as ends, quite independently of the hedonic quality of their lives”53. Therefore,
‘phenomenally grounded dignity’ could also be attributed to HCOs that manifest a
minimal degree of phenomenal consciousness.
However, if we introduce a gradation of value with respect to the level of con-
sciousness possessed by the entity under consideration, this a ects the attribution of
moral status. A basic awareness is not enough to confer a full moral status according
to Hyun54, for whom full moral status is conferred to human self-consciousness,
understood as a kindof higher ordermental awareness of one’s ownmental experiences.
And this type of higher order mental awareness requires language in the form in which
human beings developed it.
Another objection to phenomenally grounded dignity may be that oen a Kantian
perspective is adopted according to which dignity is linked to the ability of rational
beings to set ends and goals. But, Kriegel replies, can an unconscious automaton be
a rational end-setting being? If it cannot, then it seems that the rational end-setting
status implies consciousness. If it can, instead, we must consider that we have no
particular reason to treat an unconscious automaton as an end and not as a means. A
domestic robotmay soon be able to set its own goals in all of its activities, but wewould
probably not treat it as a person, because it lacks consciousness. And so we are back to
phenomenally grounded dignity55.
In accordance with criterion (B1), i.e. the idea that the allocation of moral status
depends solely on the morally relevant characteristics possessed by an entity, the idea
that sentience or a minimal form of consciousness can confer moral status on HCOs
falls within the so-called moral individualism. According to the latter, the mere ability
to experience pleasure and pain is considered a morally relevant quality, for example
by Singer56, although more complex cognitive abilities, self-awareness, rationality and
moral autonomy are considered by other authors as preferable characteristics to indi-
cate full moral status.
The strength of approaches to moral status that fall within moral individualism lies
in the fact that they are generally consistent with current scientic knowledge, because
52 Kriegel 2019, supra note 43.
53 Ib.
54 Insoo Hyun, Bioethics and the Future of StemCell Research (2013).
55 Kriegel, supra note 43.
56 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (1993).
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they are based on the entities’ possession of natural properties or properties that can be
traced back to natural properties, which can be ascertained by objective means. From a
conceptual point of view,moral individualismo ers an impartial view.The justication
of the attribution of moral status is in fact conducted by rst identifying the morally
relevant characteristics (sentience, rationality, and autonomy), independently of the
subjects carrying these characteristics (human beings, nonhuman animals, chimeras,
and human cerebral organoids) and then by dening the circle of subjects endowed
with these characteristics.
A problematic aspect that also involves our test on the moral status of HCOs is
that of the threshold. If morally relevant characteristics are natural properties owned
by individuals to varying degrees, one may ask whether the basic possession of these
characteristics is enough to attribute a certain moral status or whether it is necessary
to have these properties to a specic degree. In the second case, a relevant threshold
should be set. Yet this may raise an objection: a theory that attributes a moral status to
all beings capable of minimal sensitivity (for example, HCOs) must admit that moral
status is a progressive property and that there are di erences between the moral status
of entities (e.g. an adult human being and an organoid) that reect their di erences in
terms of basic properties.
We have seen that (B) can be formulated as a disjunction. But it is interesting to
note that this stems from the fact that the debate on moral status has so far revolved
essentially around the theme of its extension to other living species and only recently
to human-animal chimeras. The particularity of human cerebral organoids is that
they are entities with characteristics still subject to both empirical and theoretical
investigation. That said, HCOs could also fall into (B2), as they biologically belong
to the human species. The theories of moral status based on the species attribute value
to the individuals who belong to a species, usuallyHomo sapiens.
The main line of (B2) is in fact called humanism, according to which the notion of
species is not purely biological, but is rather a structurally moralized notion, inherent
to our being, so much so that our preference for co-specics is natural and not further
explainable57. Furthermore, it is argued that morally relevant properties cannot have
value regardless of our act of conferring value. And only human beings can create
moral value58 (although this in itself does not exclude that human beingsmay attribute
value to other entities). Finally, human individuals acquire value because they are
potentially able to achieve a certain genus-specic condition,which is basedona typical
representative of the species. In this sense, it is in the proper and substantial nature of
human beings to be endowed with full moral status, even when a specic individual
lacks the abilities that give rise to a moral personality59. Obviously, this argument is
used for embryos and, as we know, there is strong disagreement about its validity. It
would seem even more controversial to extend it to HCOs, even if they showed a
minimal level of consciousness.
The criteria used by species-based theories of moral status are the subject of strong
criticism for their alleged speciesism, both for their formal circularity in the justication
57 MaryMidgley, Animals andWhyTheyMat_ter (1983)
58 BernardWilliams, The Human Prejudice, in Id., Philosophy as aHumanisticDiscipline (2006).
59 Patrick Lee, Robert P. George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, 21 Ratio Juris 173 (2008).
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of the attribution of moral status and for positive prejudice to the human species.
However, given the particularity of HCOs that we have already underlined, these
criticisms do not apply here, since HCOs are entities of their own kind that could
fall into both (B1) and (B2). The only possible criticism to the attribution of a moral
status to sentient HCOs with respect to (B2) is that related to the typical individual.
A cerebral organoid cannot develop, not even potentially, into a “complete” individual,
and therefore attributing a moral status to it should be based on an objective criterion
(phenomenal consciousness) rather than on its species. One could, however, reply
that the technical and nonnatural potential of an HCO comes with the prospect of a
transplant, thanks towhich it can become the brain of a person.However, head or brain
transplantation does not seem feasible or desirable for various reasons60.
As for (B3), it seems plausible to arm that a sentient HCO could not enter into
any relationship, not even as the passive object of one. This instead can easily happen
to an individual who has entered a persistent vegetative state, or an individual born
with very serious cognitive decits, as relatives, friends or even strangers can develop
relationships of respect, care and recognition with such individuals.
Let’s move on to (C). If a moral status were attributed to an entity such as an HCO
with some form of minimal conscience, it would be necessary to clarify the moral
hierarchy in which it would be placed, what kind of rights it would acquire and what
obligations would other moral agents have towards it with respect to the treatment
to be reserved to it. In this sense, it could be said that in principle a human brain
organoidwith a rudimentary formof sensitivity, i.e. the ability to experience something
in phenomenal sense, should have amoral status, if not full at least partial. However, for
empirical reasons, whether this capacity for experience is present will probably remain
uncertain for a long time.
This “gray area” also includes the debate on the moral status and the treatment to
be reserved to human-animal chimeras. With regard to human-pig chimeras and their
alleged cognitive abilities beyond those of regular, nonchimeric pigs created for the
purpose of research or transplantation, Savulescu proposed the following argument.
“In the absence of conclusive research on these questions, any such chimera should
be accorded the highest moral status consistent with its likely nature ( . . . ) If it could
plausibly have higher cognitive functions, it should be treated as if it would have them.
In considering the new life forms we create we should err on the side of sympathy
and generosity”61. Other authors defended the idea that if we have no certainty about
some being’s moral status, we should treat it as if it had at least a partial moral status, a
perspective that refers particularly to animals62.
In a similar vein, Koplin and Wilkinson have recently proposed a Moral Status
Precautionary Principle (MSPP), according to which “a course of action should not
60 Mirko Daniel Garasic, Andrea Lavazza, Why HEAVEN Is Not About Saving Lives at All, 8 AJOB
Neuroscience 228 (2017).
61 Julian Savulescu, Should a Human-Pig Chimera Be Treated as a Person?, Aeon (2016) https://aeon.co/ideas/
should-a-human-pig-chimera-be-treated-as-a-person.
62 R. Harry Bradshaw, Consciousness in Non-Human Animals: Adopting the Precautionary Principle 5 J.
Conscious. Stud. 108 (1998); Simon Knutsson, Christian Munthe, A Virtue of Precaution Regarding the
Moral Status of Animals with Uncertain Sentience, 30 J. Agric. Environ. Ethics 213 (2017); Je  Sebo, The
Moral Problem of Other Minds, 25 Harv. Rev. Philos. 51 (2018).
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be pursued if there is a reasonable fear that the course of action will cause serious harm
to beings of full moral status, even if there is nonconclusive evidence that the being will
actually have full moral status”63.
In a crescendo of protections, once their moral status is recognized, onemight think
that (1) whole human brain organoids should not be created with harmful genetic
alterations (which would prevent the creation of models for the study of pathologies,
but the latter could be studied on organoids of specic parts of the brain, not sentient);
(2) HCOs should be sedated during invasive or destructive experiments (although it
is dicult to imagine the conditions causing distress to a sentient organ, and a sedated
organ may be scientically useless); (3) HCOs should be studied only observatively
and preserved until their natural death; (4) HCOs should not be developed beyond a
certain period of time, so as to prevent the onset of forms of sentience.
One could argue that research on HCOs could lead to the discovery of therapies
or to the laboratory growth of brain parts suitable for treating severely debilitating and
or even fatal neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s. It could also be pointed
out that sentient animals are being used in laboratories, albeit with increasing care for
their well-being. In the case of life-saving research, if none of the protections suggested
above could be granted, one could apply a principle such as that formulated by Koplin
andWilkinson, namely “Moral status non alternative principle” (MSNAP). According
to it, “a course of action may be pursued if there is a reasonable fear that the course of
actionwill cause serious harm to beings of fullmoral status, only if there is no alternative
course of action that would achieve the same benet without any risk of serious harm
to beings with full moral status”64.
In fact, it is plausible to think that there would be consensus in using HCOs, even if
they were minimally sentient, in research that could save individuals and prevent them
from losing their autonomy and rationality. In this case, however, onemaywonderwhat
the attribution of moral status serves for if it can justify such a variable value and such a
di erent array of moral treatments. Moral status would appear to be a mere label of
moral consideration of some kind, the weight and regulatory implications of which
must however be determined by the degree of morally relevant properties based on
which the moral status is granted65.
Koplin and Savulescu have very recently proposed to make the use of HCOs pro-
portionate to the importance of the research purposes or the expected benets of
the research results66. This view implies the lawfulness of using both “conscious or
potentially conscious brain organoids (equivalent to 20 weeks’ in vivo brain develop-
ment ormore)” and “brain organoids with the potential to develop advanced cognitive
capacities (e.g., mature brain organoids capable of interacting with the outside envi-
ronment).” This framework to regulate the use of HCOs capable of developing higher
consciousness and cognitive abilities is based on a consequentialist perspective that
seems tomake room for a limited exploitation of human cerebral organoids in exchange
for great expected benets related to biomedical research.
63 Julian Koplin, Dominic Wilkinson, Moral Uncertainty and the Farming of Human-Pig Chimeras, 45 J. Med.
Ethics 440 (2019).
64 Id.
65 Zuolo, supra note 43.
66 Julian Koplin, Julian Savulescu,Moral Limits of Brain Organoid Research, 47 J. LawMed. Ethics, 760 (2019).
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Finally, one can consider the so-called indirect perspective with respect to moral
status, a perspective that could nd the consensus of those who do not want to engage
in the procedure of attributing moral status to a new entity. This view imposes certain
obligations towards specic entities, not because the entities in question have their
own moral status, but because the moral entities that have relations with them have
general obligations, such as, for example, not to cause unnecessary su ering or to
respect everything related to the human being. In this context, it could be claimed that
HCOs with a basic form of sentience might not have their own moral status, but it
would still be advisable neither to create them nor, above all, to use them in destructive
experiments. Obviously, from the indirect perspective, di erent obligations on the part
of moral agents can be weighed up. And the obligation to seek treatment for serious
diseases that a	ict many human beings could prevail over the obligation not to cause
unnecessary su ering to entities that do not have a full moral status.
To sum up, ethical reection on HCOs is only in its infancy and the proposals put
forward so far are necessarily provisional, scattered along a continuum calling for very
di erent kinds of regulations. However, on the basis of the arguments developed here
about the possible moral status of human cerebral organoids, it seems reasonable to
suggest that researchers engaged in the cultivation of HCOs should try to develop or
implement tools and techniques able to evaluate the presence of a degree of conscious-
ness in human cerebral organoids themselves. Based on that potential evidence, an
expanded ethical discussion should be opened in which to consider the implications
of an absolute novelty such as a human brain isolated from body and environment.
Our general idea is that HCOs that manifest an ability to feel pain and have subjective
experiences should not be used asmere laboratory tools, whatever the possible benets
of utilizing them for research. Our position is more restrictive than most, but it’s
consistent with a Kantian-like deontological approach, although we are aware that
without communications it will be extremely dicult to assess how conscious human
cerebral organoids may be.
CONCLUSION
Rapid progress in research on human organoids and on human cerebral organoids
in particular has led to the laboratory growth of the so-called mini-brains that have
in nuce most of the structures and functions typical of a normally developed human
brain. It is therefore not implausible to think that in the not-too-distant future some
HCOs may develop a rudimentary form of sentience understood as the minimal form
of consciousness related to the basic experience of pleasure and pain that characterizes
many animal species.
This may raise ethical and legal questions, which are indeed beginning to be the
focus of reection on the general theme of the production of human organs in a dish67.
Since the broad ethical aspects of the issue have already been partially addressed68, in
this article,we startedbydealingwith the topic, unprecedented toour knowledge, of the
legal provisions thatmight be required regarding the production ofHCOs suspected of
having a rudimentary form of phenomenal consciousness.
67 Jeremy Sugarman, Annelien Bredenoord, Reections on Organoid Ethics, 24 Cell StemCell 849 (2019).
68 Cf. supra note 3
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Our analysis is based on Italian law and European law as a superordinate system.
This is a legislative and legal architecture comparable to that ofmostWestern countries
and that, given the potential conclusion of this analysis, has the advantage of being
traditionally “conservative” in terms of bioethics. Based on the current legislation and
jurisdictional rulings, it must in fact be concluded that HCOs have no right to any
special legal protection, as they donot fall into any category other than that of biological
material, which is subject to its own specic rules.
The second part of our analysis then focused on the possible moral status that
futureHCOs—sentient or potentially sentient—could obtain based on their scientic
characterization and the ethical categories onwhich there ismost consensus. The result
seems to be thatHCOswould have at least partialmoral status. This conclusion implies
the attribution of a progressive set of rights (translated into duties of the researchers
who manipulate them) to such future HCOs, on the grounds that they would be
sensitive entities. This is not a widely accepted conclusion, but it can be considered
fully consistent with the main perspectives on the attribution of moral status and its
justication.
This suggests that the legal systemmay also be called upon in the future to consider
the evidence about the supposed phenomenal consciousness of HCOs and the conse-
quencesof attributing themamoral statusof somekind.These considerations therefore
call for ethical and juridical research.The recent discovery of a complex cerebral electri-
cal activity in human cerebral organoids requires careful evaluation of the unexpected
development that they exhibit69. So, further reections ought to be elaborated in the
face of the rapid progress of scientic research, its technical translation, and its clinical
applications.
69 Supra note 20.
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